Introduction
This paper compares nationa l industry training 1 strategies introduced in Australia and New Zealand in the 1990s. These strategies account for approximately 20% of a ll participants in vocational education and training (VET) in both countries. A lthough Austra lia 's populatio n is five Figure 1 times that ofNew Zealand, there is a striking similarity in both the rate of participation per head of population, and the increase in participation in industry tra ining in both countries. Although producing seemingly similar numerical outcomes, the strategies are signifi cantly different.
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The con tex ts in which both strategies deve loped m the late 1980s incorporated:
• high levels of unemployment. espec iall y among young people;
• decreas ing employme nt in low skilled jobs especially manufacturi ng and agricu lture. shift to service industry;
• increasing demand for sk ills with a resultin g system of tra inin g responsive to skill shortages;
• the decli ne of tradit ional apprenti ceships:
• increasingly deccntral ised relationships. followi ng 'reform ' re lnti ons regulati on; empl oy ment of industri al the desire of employers and industry bodies for control over ·industry based' trainin g; critique of the public prov ision of VET as outda ted and unresponsive; an emphasis on ma rket oriented training rrov ision: and.
• the developmen t of nati onal qua lifi cati ons systems with co mpetency based assess ment and certi tication that faci litated parti cipation. prov ision. r ortnbility and rathways.
Ne\\' Zealand ·s Industry Training Strategv
In the late 19XOs several rev iews, including the reco mmemlati ons of the llaw kc Report ( 1989) . led to the eme rgence of an industry trainin g strategy (G. R. llawkc. 19XX). These recommendati ons included: (Barrowman, 1996) . The participation of disadvantaged .groups, including Maori, Pacific people and women was to be addressed.
The Industry Training Act ( 1992) came into force in Apri l 1992. It contained no clear defin ition of industry, the possible range of an ITO's coverage or the number of ITOs. Future funding and the role of ITOs in subsidising training were also unspecified. The vague drafting was intended to allow industries to decide these issues themselves.
Early ITOs emerged from the relevant industry associations and train ing boards, especially in areas where training was well established and resourced. As delays in ITO establishment and standards development hindered the process some critics claimed that existing industry training boards were not up to the demands of the new strategy (Hall, 1995) .
At the end of Apri l, 1993, ETSA and the NZQA cooperated to launch Skill New Zealand to consult with the Industry Training Task Force, polytechnics, industries and school principals (ETSA, 1994) . A more unified structure of training linked to the NQF was developed through the promotion of Skill New Zealand programmes including Skill Start for industry training, Skill Pathways for VET in schools and labour market programmes. The fund ing of industry training in the first half of the 1990s was uncertain; ITOs were dependent upon the generos ity of industry bodies and ETSA fu nding. Many ITOs had difficul ty managing growth and some were at risk of failing. ITOs argued that sustai ned government fu nd ing was essential to their growth and viab ili ty. A new Industry Training Fund was introduced in July I 995 (G reen et al., 2003) . Fundi ng was based upon a Standard Traini ng Measure (STM) where one STM was equal to a "trainee who has completed a training arrangement designed to lead to the achievement of a 120 credit National Cert ificate" (ETSA, 1996:20) . ETSA purchased a contracted number of STMs from an ITO on the basis of ITO forecasting and moni tored ITO performance. By 1999 govern ment fundi ng of industry training was calculated annually and capped for the year. This funding structure gave a degree of increased certainty to ITOs. As they became more established further funding was avai lable which led to increasing numbers. The National Government was reluctan t to increase fundi ng. although industry contributions did increase as is demonstrated by the following table. As an ind ication of the government 's commitment to training, a new ' Modern Appren ticeships' programme was introduced in all industry areas to fi ll the void left by the demise of traditional apprenticeships. Modern
Apprenticeships incorporated the concept of competencybased progression. A coordi nator was engaged through an ITO, to mentor and manage the process (Maharey, 2000) .
A review of Industry Training included new requirements fo r ITOs to: identify cu rrent and futu re skil l needs; develop strategic training plans to assist industry to meet those needs, and promote the trai ning plans. In keeping with the Labour Government's Employment Relations Act 2000, wh ich encouraged col lective bargaining and a greater role for unions, ITOs were requi red to develop arrangements fo r collective representation of employees. Procedures were established for ITOs, subject to the agreement of the majority of employers within the • putting government policy into effect;
• negoti ati ng charters and profiles wi th tertiary providers including ITOs;
• all oca tin g funds to te11iary education prov iders and IT Os;
• building system ca pab ility; and,
• monitoring and evaluation. policy and research.
ITOs arc represented by the Industry Traini ng Federation ( ITF) wh ich provides a forum for members, co llects and produces information on be half of its members, untkrtakes resea rch for policy developmen t. makes submissions to govemn1ent. supports and promotes th e image and role of ITOs and encourages cross sec tor tklloguc wi th parties interested in PCET (ITF, 2002 In September that year, wi th increasing sk il l shortages. ::1 furth er $5 milli on was provided for inuustry training with $8.9 million over the next four years to fund an add iti onal I .000 more Modem Arprent iccship places ).
The New Zea land strategy has robust quality control procedures. Quality Assurance occurs through the use of industry sta ndards in training and assessment. Standards arc regular ly reviewed in consultation with industry rarticipants. ITO invol ve ment and workplace assessment f~te ilitatc eva luati on of the qua lity of' training provision.
They are moderated internally and externally. All Tertiary Providers are audited and must meet NZQA registration standards. introduced the concept of traineesh ips in response to increasing youth unemployment. The Australian Traineeship System (A TS) departed from previous shortterm labour market programmes as it: introduced yearlong contracts, accred ited broad-based off-the-job traini ng; the development through T AFE of state curricu lum training packages; coordinated industry and union in vo lvement, and national certification fo r admission to furt her education (H. Smith, 1988) . The earl y forecast of 75,000 annual trainees was not met. The total by June 1989 was just over 18,000 (Dumbrell, 2003 ) . Barriers to increased training included ex isting industrial regulations, employer support for training and Commonwealth/State re lationships.
The Development of the Australian Training Strategy
In the late 1980 the development of government policy to prov ide ski lls traini ng in the workplace, and the recru itment of un ion cooperation to ach ieve greater workplace effic iency and flex ibi lity, were linked in the refonn of regul ations governing industrial awards (Carmichacl, 1989; Dawkins, 1988 Dawkins, , 1989 . These changes marked th e disintegration of national agreements and the growth of en terprise, site and individual agreements. Th is led to the erosion of union resistance to new apprent ices in 'protected occupations' and their employment on indi vidual contracts in new industry areas In 1996 the Work place Relations Act ( 1996) introduced Australian Workplace Agreements (A WAs), wh ich enabled employers to enter in to individua l non-union contracts wi th empl oyees. Individualised non-registered common law agreements outside of the fonnal industrial relations framework are also common (Katz, Lee, & Lee, 2004) .
Employer reluctance to train was also regarded as a significant impediment. The Dawkins report ( 1988) expressed concern at the fai lure of employers to spend enough on employee trai ning and development. To address this concern the Train ing Guarantee Scheme was introduced in 1990; employers with payroll costs in excess of $200,000 were required to spend up to 1.5 per cent of thei r payroll on structured employee training for their employees. The scheme was withdrawn m 1994 following employer protest (A. Smith, 2003a In 1996 the Howard Coalition government established the New Apprenticeship programme. The industry led Australian Vocational Training System (A VTS) , took effect from January I998. In many ways the scheme was similar to the I986 Australian Traineeship Scheme: it promoted the entry-level recruitment of unemployed youth on employment/training contracts for a set duration of one or more years across all industry areas; involved competency-based workplace training and assessment; national certification; a training wage; and ' user-choice' of training provider (Saunders, 200 1 ) . Key differences include the extent of funding available to promote the scheme and the structural framework required for its implementation.
The National Qualifications Framework (N QF) was established to register all post-compulsory education qualifications as national qualifications with common institutional criteria. The National Training Framework set guidelines for state regulation of the New Apprenticeship System. The Australia Quality Training Framework (AQTF) was established to ensure the quality of VET services by detennining nationally agreed standards for registering training organisations and course accrediting bodies.
Industry Training Advisory Bodies (IT ABs) were established to develop training packages and industry training strategies at Commonwealth and State levels. The first training packages were introduced in 1999. Packages contain training support materials, competency standards, assessment guide lines and qualification titles and requirements. In 2002 the Commo nwealth announced an end to State ITAB support such that where ITABs still exist, they are under-resourced and dependent upon state and industry ass istance . In order to rationalise bureaucracy the twenty-nine Nationa l ITABs have been reduced to 10 Skills Counc ils (Karrnel, 2004 ) , a move that required some federal coerc ion.
The Commonwealth set up New Apprenticeship Centres (NACs) to promote and service New Apprenticeships and administer the Commonwealth 's employer incentives program (Goozee, 1999) . State government training authorities (STAs) fund and administer training through a variety of providers that are required to register and confonn to the standards established by the AQTF. The Registered Training Organisations (RTOs) provide training; assess trainees using competency standards, report achievements and award qualifications. RTOs include TAFE institutes, private training and assessment organisations, enterprises, schools, community organisations and adult education providers. Group Training Organisations (GTOs) had been around since the early 1970s. As RTOs they manage the training and employment of a majority of apprentices and trainees in the traditional trades; many are placed with ' host employers· who provide day-to-day on-the-job training.
Employers are able to employ New Apprentices through a variety of pathways including: the ir own recruitment processes; New Apprenti ceship Centres (NACs); the Job Network; the Jobs Pathway Programme, and Group Training Providers. Tra inees are required to sign an employment contract and a training agreement that sets out their roles and responsibilities and includes a trai ning plan and outcomes to be assessed. They may be paid a 'trai ning wage' reflecting time-spent training and may be employed under state awards or enterprise based awards. Australian Workplace Agreements o r Certified Agreements a llow the employer to vary the mix of training and working time (providing certai n conditions are met).
The training system is based upon employer demand and is driven by fina ncial incenti ves. Commonwea lth subsidies and incenti ves are provided to encourage employers to offer tra1nmg opportunities Uobs). Incenti ves of up to $4,400 are available subject to new appren tices and employers meeting eligibil ity criteria. In the 2003-04 financ ia l year the Com mo nwealth government paid over half a bill ion dollars in employer incentives. The projected cost to the Commonwealth for 2005. including the administration of NACs , is about three quarters of a billio n (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004) . Thi s does not include training and administration costs incurred by state governments. Employer incentive payments were ex tended to include current employees in I 999; they now make up approx imate ly 30% of a ll trainees. Concern has been expressed that some employers were abusing the system by s igning up large numbers of employees and providing low qua lity on-thejob training (of the latter, 2003 ).
Recognition of Pri or Learning (RPL) was to play an important part in the training process by making quallfications easier to attain by recognising ex1stmg skills and competencies. But RPL is not popular in the current VET system. There are no incenti ves to progress its application and employers prefer the ease and incent ives attac hed to tra ining (Schofi e ld, 200 I). State agenc ies are re luctant to fu nd RPL due to a distrust of RTO assessment processes and perceived costs (L. Sm ith, 2004) .
The User C hoice poli cy was intended to enabl e employers and employees to dec ide who wou ld provide the training. It was also intended to make off-the-job training more responsive to the needs of industry, encourage a competitive providers market to contest the Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 2004 privileged position of TAFE, and reduce the cost of trammg prov1s1on (Goozee, op.cit: 97) . Ingersoll describes User Choice as a strategy to shift the provision of VET from the supply to the demand side (lngersoll, 2004) .
Outcomes
Overall, the New Apprenticeship system has produced some major ac hievements. Large numbers of new employees have been taken direct ly onto training programmes and large numbers of ex isting employees have had the opportunity to validate and develop the ir skills (A. Smith , 2003b) . Brooks (2004: 18) ) reports "About 15% of all 15-19-yearold employed persons. were employed as an apprentice or trainee at 31 December 2002''. For teenagers not in fulltime education. more th an 36% of those in full-time employment were apprentices or trainees (a relatively constant proportion since 1997 ). She notes that these figures show "the importance of apprenticeshi ps and trai neeships for teenage emp loyment". These concerns include that:
• some of the Ne"v Apprenticeships growth is driven by some employe rs using the system as a wage subsidy scheme and paying insufficient attenti on to training ( rersonal communications: Senate Standing Committee. 2003: .212; (Buchanan & Eversson, 2004) ; Scholield, 200 I a).
• some trainees fee l they arc 'being used as cheap labour' and this is a significant factor in noncomrlction of truineeships (Cu ll y & Curtain. 200 I. Sclwlield. 200 I a). In 1998-2003 the nati onal nonCt)mplction rate was optimistically put around 35%. In other ,,·orJs of 1.52 million trainees 530.000 did not complete their traincesh ips.
• training delivered and monitoring to ensure compliance wit h Training Agreements is in adequate (Buchanan. Considine et al.. 2002; Schoficld, 200 1b) . The 2000 Senate Standing Committee report rCCL)mmended that ANTA shou ld work to ensu re that training plans we re rroperl y used and effecti ve ly monitored. However ANT 1\ 's response was that existing arrangemen ts we re adequate (Senate Standing Comm ittee, 2003 ).
• on-the-job trammg advantaged employers, especially large employers, as it is usually cheaper. Two large retailers built their in-house training on the back of employer incentives received from signing up trainees. They were able to cover the cost of training existing employees by including them in in-house training with new apprentices (Personal communication).
• employers carrying out fully on the job trammg resu lted in enterprise specific training and thus limited opportunities for trainees to acquire broader knowledge and skills (Senate Standing Committee, 2003) .
• " in a system where everyone has a commercial interest, there is no ' honest broker' who can give disinterested advice" (Senate Standing Committee, 2003 :2 12). It is poss ible for an enterprise, as an NAC, GTO or RTO to approve its own trai ning arrangements, assess its own quality and issue qual ifications whilst administering all financial benefits to itself. There is pressure to sign off assessment processes in order to attain the completion payment.
• some NACs and GTOs place trainees without regard to the suitabi lity of the placements. They promote train cesh ips that are easy to sell and , because these are primari ly low-skill jobs in larger enterprises where there are no skill shortages, they are of little benefit to industry (Senate Stand ing Commi ttee, 2003 ).
• there has consequently been large growth in relatively low level (Leve l rii) traineeships. This has resulted in a lack of employees wi th higher skill levels such as in midd le and upper management (Buchanan, Evesson et al., 2002; Buchanan , Watson, Campbell, & Briggs, 2003) .
• there has been a decline in traditional apprenticeships resulting in skill shortages in many trades (Buchanan, Considine et al., 2002) .
• there are grow ing numbers of part-time trai neeships. In 2002, excluding traditional apprenticeships, 34% of trainccships were part time. The above points raise the questi on of whether a credi table training culture exists to equ ip employees for futu re empl oyment.
The following Brooks, 2004; Morgan, 2004; NCVER, 2004a; TEC, 2004 A second • to train as wide a range of workers as possible.
It is driven by:
• Commonwealth government policy;
• Commonwealth incentives to employers to encourage them to engage trainees; and ,
• emp loyer demand for training, partially perhaps to reap financial benefits.
• Its positive features may include:
• the reduction of youth unemp loyment;
• the extension of training into all industry areas and to all employees;
• the facilitation of business based training structures (e.g. enterprise RTOs); and,
• the st imulation of the economy by the expenditure of public funds in the private sector.
Its negative features include:
• a fai lure to de li ver appropriate short term and longtcnn industry sk i lis;
• fundi ng directed to unnecessary training;
• the use of trainees as low cost labour. resulting m masked producti vi ty increases;
• corruption;
• con nict between Commonwealth and State gllVern men ts;
• future skill needs are subject to distorted ·market' forces; and.
• a failure to address small bus inesses needs;
The " Lite-lunch" Model
The New Zea land system's mai n functions include:
• e'\tending industry training throughout industries and fl) all employees. and
• encouragi ng an envi ronment in whi ch ITOs. trammg pro\ idcrs. employers and trainee~ cooperate to deli ver appropriate training.
lt is driven by:
• Gll\'crn ment poli cy and funding to ITOs to man age train i nl!; ~ • ITOs that promote and market trai ning to emp loyers; and.
• employer demand for training.
• Its pos iti ve features include:
• a relative ly simple administrati ve structure and a su pporti ve gove rnment;
• ITOs tha t operate at the in terface of industry and train ing;
• people "orking at grass roots le vel to ac hi eve the objec ti ves l)f the industry training system:
• a comprehensive qualifications system that is interlinked with school and VET qualifications so that all student records are coordinated around a National Student Number.;
• funding levels that do not encourage corruption; and, Its negative features include:
• insufficient funding to meet the demand for training;
• insuffi cient funding to allow ITOs to fulfil their potential;
• training funding and ITO administrative funding being a lump sum rather than separate funds. ITOs and training provi ders might adopt practices that generate income for their survival and detract from training needs;
• the lack of an adequate co-ordinating body. The absorption of Skill New Zealand (ETSA) into TEC has resu lted in insufficient attention being paid to research, data co llection and policy development; and,
• a lack of research and evaluation
Conclusion
The above analysis does little justice to the undeniable successes of both systems. However it does indicate ave nues for furt her research, including an evaluation of whether the models I have proposed are accurate. A way to deepen understanding of the two countries' industry trai ning systems would be to deve lop a series of models to describe and explain the different methods of engagement that enterprises adopt when dealing with industry training. Some research has been carried out in Australi a, for exa mple: in the operation of Group Trai ning Organisations and in skill s formation in Victorian manufacturing industries (Buchanan et. al: , 2004 , and the engagement of retail enterprises with the New Apprenticeship scheme (lngersoll, 2004) . There has been some research into ITOs in New Zealand but not in this area (Murray, 200 I, 2003 (Murray, 200 I, , 2003 Piercy, 2003) .
It is tempting to suggest that the shortfalls of the Australi an New Apprenticeship system are partly a result of the seemingly unlimited amount of Commonwealth fundi ng of employer incentives. Whereas the New Zealand industry training strategy is successful despite limited governmen t fu nding. New Zealand also has the benefi t of simple administrative structures, a supportive nationa l government and ITOs that operate at ground level. A concern for the Australian system is that it may not be sustainabl e wi thout large amounts of government funding. Further research into the operation of New Zealand's industry train ing strategy could provide insight for reform of industry train ing in Austral ia.
The New Zea land Electrotechnology ITO (ETITO) Executive Director Marilyn Brady in an address to the 2002 ITF conference stated:
[F]or those companies who sign up their employees to training, there are not the incentives available elsewhere on the globe. There is a subsidy to assist with the cost of training. There is no longer a wage subsidy or skill start payment. There are no tax breaks. New Zealand enterprises are using industry training because of the intrinsic benefits the system offers them in building their sk ills for their futures (Brady, 2002) .
A key question remains: What are the structural, funding and policy arrangements that provide the optimal conditions to sustain an industry training strategy that wi ll enhance the capability of indiv iduals and enterprises? Notes 1. Industry trammg discussed m this paper 1s workplace-focused training, which may not contain an off-the-job component. It is assessed in terms of a person's competency to reproduce thei r training in the workplace such that on-the-job assessment is a significant feature.
